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INTRODUCTION
A local government's power to enact zoning regulations
falls within the general power to provide for the health,
safety and welfare of its citizenry. Typically, if a zoning
ordinance is not inherently unfair, unreasonable or
oppressive, the person attacking it must assume the burden of
affirmatively showing that as applied to him, it is
unreasonable, unfair or oppressive. 1 However, when zoning and
land use legislation impacts rights protected by the First
Amendment, presumably the government would be held to a higher
standard, and the courts would reverse the usual presumption
of constitutionality. This paper addresses a few selected
First Amendment issues as they apply to zoning and land use
restrictions in Georgia.
Free speech review of zoning ordinances applies to zoning
for adult sex businesses, such as adult book stores and
cinemas. The First Amendment balancing test that is
applicable to adult entertainment ordinances is discussed in
Chapter One. Judicial review applied to adult entertainment
is not quite as intensive as strict scrutiny equal protection
judicial review of regulation affecting fundamental interests
or suspect classifications.
1 2 Dill. Mun. Corp. 928, §591
1
2The regulation of adult entertainment establishments has
often been accomplished through a liquor licensing process.
As a result, adult entertainment ordinances were typically-
analyzed under a Twenty- first Amendment review which provided
local governments broad authority to regulate. However, since
44 Liquormart v. Rhode Island2 , a First Amendment analysis is
applied to adult entertainment restrictions, regardless of
whether or not liquor is permitted. Under the First Amendment
analysis, the authority to regulate is less broad.
The free speech impact of restrictions on signs and
billboards is discussed in Chapter Two. In the leading
advertising sign and billboard case, the trial court, in
Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego, 3 enjoined enforcement
of the City of San Diego's billboard ordinance. The
California Supreme Court reversed the judgment enjoining the
enforcement, stating that "[t]o hold that a city cannot
prohibit off-site commercial billboards for the purpose of
protecting and preserving the beauty of the environment is to
succumb to a bleak materialism". 4 The Court concluded its
opinion with "the pungent words of Ogden Nash":
"I think that I shall never see
"A billboard lovely as a tree.
"Indeed, unless the billboards fall,
"I'll never see a tree at all." 5
2517 U.S. 484, 116 S . Ct . 1495, 134 L.Ed. 2d 711 (1996).
326 Cal.3d 848, 164 Cal.Rptr. 510, 610 P. 2d 407 (1980)
4 Jd. at 885, 164 Cal . Rptr. at 532, 61 P. 2d at 429.
5Jd.
3The United States Supreme Court reversed the California
Supreme Court in a plurality opinion. 6
Although commercial speech was considered outside the
scope of First Amendment protection for many years, it was
recognized as having a limited measure of protection in 1976
in Virginia Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer
Council, Inc. 1 The regulation of commercial speech is
analyzed according to the Central Hudson 8 four-part test.
Noncommercial speech is given a higher degree of protection
than is commercial speech.
Finally, in Chapter Three, zoning and the free exercise
clause of the First Amendment is discussed as it applies to
the regulation of religious uses of land. The United States
Congress enacted legislation to protect religious institutions
from government regulation. 9 However, the legislation was
unconstitutional. 10 Georgia courts do not recognize First
6Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego, 453 U.S. 490, 101
S.Ct. 2882, 69 L.Ed. 2d 800 (1981).
7425 U.S. 748, 96 S.Ct. 1817, 48 L.Ed. 2d 346 (1976)
(Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (arguing that First Amendment was
designed to protect discussion of political, social or other
public issues, rather than commercial speech) ; see also City
of Doraville v. Turner Communications Corp., 236 Ga . 385, 223
S.E.2d 798 (1976) .
8Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public Service
Commission of New York, 447 U.S. 557, 100 S.Ct. 2343, 65
L.Ed. 2d 431 (1980) .
9Pub. L. No. 103-141, 107 Stat. 1488 (1993) (codified at
42 U.S.C§§2000bb et seg) .
"Employment Division v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 110 S.Ct.
1595, 108 L.Ed. 2d 876 (1989).
4Amendment protection for religious uses in the face of zoning
regulations. A traditional zoning analysis is applied with
regulations being invalidated only if they are unreasonable or
arbitrary.
CHAPTER ONE
ADULT ENTERTAINMENT
I. Introduction
In L'Hote v. New Orleans11 , in 1900, the U.S. Supreme
Court held that local governments may exercise their police
power to regulate businesses "which minister to and feed upon
human weaknesses, appetites, and passions", upholding a city-
ordinance confining the residence of prostitutes to certain
locations within the city. In 1991, in Barnes v. Glen
Theatre, Inc. 12 , the Court stated that "public indecency,
including nudity, was a criminal offense at common law". 13
The Court further noted that " [p] ublic nudity was considered
an act malum in se". 14 The Court upheld the
constitutionality of a statute requiring nude dancers to wear
"pasties" and a "G-string" finding that "public indecency
statutes such as the one before us reflect the moral
disapproval of people appearing in the nude among strangers in
X1177 U.S. 87, 20 S.Ct. 788 (1900).
12501 U.S. 560, 111 S.Ct. 2456 (1991)
13 Id. at 567, 111 S.Ct. at 2461.
14 Id. , citing LeRoy v. Sidley, 1 Sid. 168, 82 Eng. Rep.
1036 (K.B. 1664) .
6public places". 15 Thus, the Court has not been overly-
protective of First Amendment rights regarding adult
entertainment establishments.
Adult entertainment establishments that hold liquor
licenses are often regulated through the liquor licensing
process. The power of the government to regulate liquor
licenses is recognized under the Twenty-first Amendment. 16
Until the U.S. Supreme Court's opinion in 44 Liquormart v.
Rhode Island11 , the Court recognized that a state has broad
power to regulate the sale of liquor, including a ban on
nudity where alcoholic beverages are served. 18 In 44
Liquormart, the Court disavowed the Twenty- first Amendment
analysis in its earlier decisions and held that the Twenty-
first Amendment does not lend an added presumption in favor of
the validity of regulation of otherwise protected speech.
Rather, the Court held that regulation of the sale of liquor
at adult entertainment establishments was subject to a First
Amendment analysis. 19 Nevertheless, even considering First
Amendment protections, the Court recognized states' broad
power to regulate the sale of alcohol and upheld the ordinance
in question.
15 Id.
16U.S. Const., amend, xxi, §2
17517 U.S. 484, 116 S . Ct . 1495, 134 L.Ed. 2d 711 (1996)
.
18California v. LaRue, 409 U.S. 109, 93 S . Ct . 390, 34
L.Ed. 2d 342 (1972)
.
19 Id.
7Following the line of cases analyzed under the Twenty-
first Amendment, the Georgia Supreme Court in Harris v.
Entertainment Systems, Inc. 20 , found unconstitutional a
statute regulating liquor sales in nude dancing
establishments, in part because Georgia did not have an
equivalent to the Twenty- first Amendment. Georgia's
constitution was amended to provide a "mini Twenty- first
Amendment" 21 before the decision in 44 Liquormart was
rendered. In Goldrush II v. City of Marietta22 , the Georgia
Supreme Court considered the new "mini Twenty- first
Amendment", but in accordance with 44 Liquormart held that a
First Amendment analysis of the ordinance in question was
required.
Thus, cases in both federal and state courts in Georgia
are now analyzed under the principles of the First Amendment.
The test applied is that a regulation that infringes upon
protected expression will be upheld if it (1) furthers an
important government interest; (2) if the government interest
is unrelated to the suppression of speech; and (3) if the
incidental restriction of speech is no greater than essential
to the furtherance of that interest. 23
20259 Ga. 701, 386 S.E.2d 140 (1989)
21Ga. Const art. I, §1, %5
.
22267 Ga. 683, 482 S.E.2d 347 (1997)
23 Id.
8incidental restriction of speech is no greater than essential
to the furtherance of that interest. 23
II. The Twenty-First Amendment Analysis
a. The United States Constitution
Since adult entertainment establishments often hold
licenses to sell alcoholic beverages, regulation of such
establishments often occurs through the liquor licensing
process. Generally, the U.S. Supreme Court has recognized
that states have broad power to impose restrictions on the
sale of liquor. 24 Until the Court's opinion in 44 Licpioinnart
v. Rhode Island25 , this power was recognized under the
principles of the Twenty-first Amendment. The Twenty-first
Amendment, which repealed the national liquor prohibition,
further provides that " [t] he transportation . . . into any state
. . . for delivery or use therein of intoxicating liquors, in
violation of the laws thereof, is hereby prohibited". 25
Accordingly, the Court has recognized that a state has power
to totally prohibit the sale of liquor within its
boundaries. 27 The Court has also recognized that a state has
power to regulate the time, place and manner in which liquor
23 Id.
2iLaRue, 409 U.S. 109.
25517 U.S. 484, 116 S . Ct . 1495, 134 L.Ed. 2d 711 (1996).
26U.S. Const., amend. XXI, § 2.
27Ziffin, Inc. v. Reeves, 308 U.S. 132, 138, 60 S . Ct . 163,
167, 84 L.Ed. 128 (1939) .
9may be sold, including a ban on nudity where alcoholic
beverages are served. 28 For example, in California v.
LaRue29 , the Court upheld the constitutionality of a
California statute which prohibited acts of "gross sexuality"
in establishments licensed by the state to serve liquor. 30
In LaRue, the Court quoted its opinion in Joseph E.
Seagram & Sons v. Hostetter31 , stating " [c] onsideration of
any state law regulating intoxicating beverages must begin
with the Twenty- first Amendment...". 32 The LaRue Court
acknowledged that since states are vested with general police
power, they require no specific grant of authority in the
Federal Constitution to legislate with respect to matters
traditionally found within the scope of the police power. 33
However, the Court held, the broad sweep of the Twenty- first
Amendment has been recognized as conferring something more
than the normal state authority over public health, welfare
and morals. 34
28LaRue, 409 U.S. 109 (1972)
.
29Id.
30 Id.
31384 U.S. 35, 41, 86 S . Ct 1254, 1259, 16 L.Ed. 2d 336
(1966) .
32 Id.
33409 U.S. at 112, 93 S . Ct at 394.
3i Id.
,
citing Hostetter v. Idlewild Bon Voyage Liquor
Corp., 377 U.S. 324, 330, 84 S . Ct . 1293, 1297, 12 L.Ed. 2d 350
(1964), and State Board v. Young's Market Co. 299, U.S. 59,
64, 57 S.Ct. 77, 79, 81 L.Ed 38 (1936).
10
Similarly, in New York State Liquor Authority v.
Bellanca, 35 the Court followed a Twenty-first Amendment
analysis and upheld a New York statute prohibiting topless
dancing in establishments licensed to serve liquor. The New
York Court of Appeals in that case had reasoned that topless
dancing was a form of protected expression under the First
Amendment and that the State had not demonstrated a need for
prohibiting "licensees from presenting non-obscene topless
dancing performances to willing customers". 36 However, the
U.S. Supreme Court reasoned that the states' broad power under
the Twenty- first Amendment allowed regulation of the sale of
liquor. 37
The Court decided several cases thereafter following a
similar Twenty-first Amendment analysis. 38 However, in 1996,
in 44 Liquormart v. Rhode Island29 , the Court held that the
35 452 U.S. at 714, 101 S. Ct . 2599, 69 L.Ed. 2d 357
(1981) .
36 Id.
, citing Bellanca v. New York State Liquor Authority,
at 50 N.Y.2d 524, 529, 429 N.Y.S.2d 616, 619, 407 N.E.2d 460,
463.
37452 U.S. at 714; (nevertheless, the Court recognized
that not all of the prohibited acts would be found obscene and
may therefore be entitled to some measure of First Amendment
protection)
.
36See, e.g. New York State Liquor Authority v. Bellanca,
452 U.S. 714, 101 S. Ct . 2599, 69 L.Ed. 2d. 357 (1981); Barnes
v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 501 U.S., Ill S. Ct . 2456, 115 L.Ed.
2d. 504 (1991). See also Doran v. Salem Inn, Inc., 422 U.S.
922, 95 S.Ct. 2561, 45 L.Ed. 2d 648 (1975) (striking down
ordinance that was broader than that either in LaRue or
Bellanca since it proscribed conduct at "any public place")
.
39517 U.S. 484, 116 S. Ct . 1495, 134 L.Ed. 2 711 (1996).
11
Twenty- first Amendment was not "a font of some sort of super
authority above and beyond the considerable police powers
retained by the States and which trumped the First Amendment
when liquor regulation was at issue" 40 . Thus, the Court's
analysis in cases involving regulation of liquor licenses has
changed. In 44 Liquormart v. Rhode Island, club owners who
held liquor licenses and offered nude entertainment challenged
the constitutionality of a city ordinance prohibiting nude
dancing in establishments licensed to sell liquor. 41 The
Court disavowed the idea that the Twenty- first Amendment lends
an added presumption in favor of the validity of regulation of
otherwise protected speech when it is at the site of the sale
of alcoholic beverages and held that "[e]ntirely apart from
the Twenty- first Amendment, the state has ample power to
prohibit the sale of alcoholic beverages in inappropriate
locations." 42 The Court upheld the ordinance under the First
Amendment analysis.
In cases following 44 Liquormart, the courts have
recognized the shift from analyzing cases under the Twenty-
first Amendment to a First Amendment analysis. For example,
recently, the 11th Circuit Court of Appeals in Sammy's of
Mobile v. City of Mobile, 43 upheld an ordinance prohibiting
*°Id. at 515, 116 S.Ct. at 1514.
41 Jd.
42517 U.S. at 515, 116 S.Ct. at 1514
43140 F.3d 993 (11th Cir. 1998).
12
nude dancing in establishments licensed to sell liquor under
a First Amendment analysis. The Court in Sammy's stated that
cases decided in accordance with the principles of the First
Amendment would likely meet with the same results as those
decided under a Twenty-first Amendment analysis. The 11th
Circuit Court predicted that the Supreme Court in the LaRue
case, for example, would probably have reached the same
conclusion under a First Amendment analysis.
b. The Georgia Constitution - "Mini Twenty-First
Amendment"
The 1983 Georgia Constitution provides for freedom of
speech as follows:
"No law shall be passed to curtail or restrain the
freedom of speech or of the press . Every person may
speak, write, and publish sentiments on all subjects but
shall be responsible for the abuse of that liberty.
"
44
The Georgia Supreme Court held in Harris v. Entertainment
Systems, Inc., 45 in 1989, that the above constitutional
protection limits the state's police power. The court
addressed a state statute 46 which regulated liquor sales in
nude dancing establishments and held that because Georgia has
no constitutional equivalent to the Twenty- first Amendment,
the state's police power, though possibly not limited under
the United States constitution, is limited by Georgia's
44Ga. Const, art. I, §1, %5
.
45259 Ga. 701, 386 S.E. 2d 140 (1989)
46O.C.G.A. §§ §3-3-40 - 3-3-46.
13
constitution. 47 The Court held that although a state may
have a certain amount of its police power restored to it under
the Twenty- first Amendment that would otherwise be limited
under the First Amendment, the expression involved in an
establishment offering sexually-oriented communication where
alcohol is served is still within the purview of the First
Amendment, and is further protected by Georgia's free
expression guarantees. 48
After the statute was held to be unconstitutional by the
Court in Harris, nude dancing establishments began to open in
the Forest Park, Georgia area. 49 After the Mayor and the
entire incumbent city council of Forest Park were turned out
of office in November 1993, state representatives from the
area introduced House Resolution 709 for the following
reasons: "(1) as a response to the opening of a nude dance
club in Forest Park, Georgia, and (2) as an attempt to
authorize local governments throughout Georgia to regulate
public nudity in combination with the sale of alcoholic
beverages" 50 . House Resolution 709 51 proposed an amendment
47Art. 1, §1, H 5.
48259 Ga. 701, 386 S.E.2d 140 (1989).
495ee 11 Ga. St. U. L. Rev. 33 (1994) {citing interviews
with legislators sponsoring House Resolution 709)
.
50 Id. (citing a telephone interview with Rep. Gail
Buckner, House District No. 95; and, Legislative Briefs:
Constitutional Amendment to Regulate Liquor Sales Is Proposed,
Atlanta J. Feb. 3, 1994 at 14)
.
51Ga. L. 1994, p. 2018, §1
14
to the constitution providing that the state shall have full
and complete authority to regulate alcoholic beverages in any
manner permitted under the Twenty- first Amendment to the
United States Constitution. The amendment passed and became
known as the "mini Twenty-first Amendment". 52
Following the adoption of the "mini Twenty- first
Amendment", the City of Marietta, Georgia, adopted an
amendment to its adult entertainment ordinance prohibiting
anyone from simultaneously holding licenses for adult
entertainment and the sale of liquor. 53 Three club owners
filed suit challenging the ordinance. The City argued, in
Goldrush II v. City of Marietta5*
,
that it was given an added
presumption in favor of validity under the Twenty- first
Amendment dealing with the regulation of the sale of alcohol
in adult entertainment establishments. 55 The City also
argued the ordinance was valid under a First Amendment
analysis
.
Following the trial court's order in Goldrush II, but
prior to the Georgia Supreme Court's ruling, the U.S. Supreme
Court issued its ruling in 44 Liquormart v. Rhode Island.
Relying on 44 Liquormart, the Georgia Supreme Court found that
the trial court had erred in analyzing the City's ordinance
52Ga . Const . Art . 3
, § 6 , 1 7
"City of Marietta Council Bill No. 400195, Ordinance Bill
No. 5399.
54267 Ga. 683, 482 S.E.2d 347 (1997)
.
55 Id.
15
under the principles of the Twenty- first Amendment. 56
However, the error was harmless because the Court also
analyzed the case under the First Amendment. 57 The Court
upheld the constitutionality of the Amendment to the Georgia
Constitution and stated that the amendment was not self-
executing; rather, it delegates regulatory authority to the
counties and municipalities in Georgia. 58 The Court upheld
the constitutionality of the City of Marietta's ordinance
following a First Amendment analysis finding that it did not
violate free speech protections.
III. The First Amendment Balancing Test
Following 44 Liquormart, both cases involving adult
entertainment with liquor sales and cases involving adult
entertainment without liquor sales have been analyzed under
the principles of the First Amendment. Although adult
entertainment often involves non-verbal conduct, the U.S.
Supreme Court has recognized that certain non-verbal conduct,
or symbolic speech, is protected by the First Amendment. 59
For example, symbolic speech was held to be protected in
56Id.
57 Id.
58 Id. at 684, 482 S.E.2d at 351.
59Stromberg v. California 283 U.S. 359 (1931)
16
United States v. O'Brien, 60 in which the Court considered a
conviction for draft card burning.
In O'Brien, the Court held that although symbolic speech
is protected by the First Amendment, it is not entitled to a
strict scrutiny analysis. Rather, an intermediate level of
scrutiny was applied and the Court held that the regulation
would be upheld if it met the following four-part test: (1)
the governmental regulation is within the constitutional power
of the government; (2) the regulation furthers a substantial
governmental interest; (3) the interest served is unrelated to
the suppression of free expression; and (4) the incidental
restriction on First Amendment freedoms is no greater than is
essential to the furtherance of the governmental interest. 61
The O'Brien test was applied in Barnes v. Glenn Theater,
Inc. 62 and subsequent adult entertainment cases.
Georgia courts have applied a substantially similar test.
In Paramount Pictures Corp. v. Busbee63
,
the Georgia Supreme
Court held that a regulation that infringes upon protected
expression will be upheld if (1) it furthers an important
government interest; (2) if the government interest is
unrelated to the suppression of speech; and (3) if the
incidental restriction of speech is no greater than is
60391 U.S. 367, 88 S . Ct . 1673, 20 L.E.2d 672 (1968).
61 Jd.
62501 U.S. 560, 111 S.Ct. 2456, 115 L.Ed. 2d 504 (1991).
"250 Ga. 252, 297 S.E.2d 250 (1982) .
17
essential to the furtherance of that interest. 64 The
Paramount test was reaffirmed and followed by the Court in
Goldrush II v. City of Marietta 65 .
a. An Important Government Interest.
In Goldrush II, the Court reaffirmed the holding in
Paramount that the regulation of adult entertainment
establishments is an important government function. The Court
relies on the law's preamble or purpose clause to determine
the government's interest. 66 In Goldrush II, as in most
other cases involving adult entertainment regulation, the
Court held that the government's interest in combatting the
undesirable secondary effects of such establishments
constituted an important government interest within the
meaning of the Paramount test. 67
b. Unrelated to Suppression of Speech
i. Content -neutral v. Content -based
Where the government's actions are aimed at communicative
impact, then the action is said to be content -based. 68 Where
the government's actions are not aimed at communicative
64 Jd. at 256, 257, 297 S.E.2d 250.
65267 Ga. 683, 482 S.E.2d 347 (1997)
66 Jd. at 690, 482 S.E.2d at 355.
61Goldrush II, 267 Ga . 683.
68See Laurence H. Tribe, American Constitutional Law, at 791-792
(Foundation Press, 2d Ed. 1988)
.
18
impact, but nonetheless have an adverse impact on
communicative opportunity, then the action is said to be
content -neutral
.
69
Cinevision v. City of Burbank10 is an example of a case
in which the court struck down a regulation it found to be
content -based. In Cinevision, the City attempted to restrict
the use of a city coliseum to non "rock and roll"
performances. The City argued that "hard-rock" concerts, such
as Todd Rundgren and Jackson Brown, are a per se nuisance and
therefore, the City was justified in excluding them. The
Court held that the city violated the promoter's First
Amendment rights by disapproving proposed concerts on the
basis of the content of the performer's expression and other
arbitrary factors. 71
In Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc. 12
,
the U.S. Supreme
Court rendered a 5-4 split opinion on the question of whether
the government regulation was content -based. The government
action at issue in Barnes was Indiana's public indecency law
which required nude dancers in adult entertainment
establishments to wear "pasties" and "G-strings" . The Court
stated that the state's interest is
unrelated to the suppression of free expression.
Some may view restricting nudity on moral grounds
69 Jd.
70745 F.2d 560 (9th Cir. 1984).
71 Id.
72501 U.S. 560, 111 S.Ct. 2456 (1991)
19
as necessarily related to expression. We disagree.
It can be argued, of course, that almost limitless
types of conduct - including appearing in the nude
in public - are "expressive", and in one sense of
the word this is true. People who go about in the
nude in public may be expressing something about
themselves by doing so." 73
The Court rejected that notion of expressive conduct, and
stated that it could not accept "the view that an apparently
limitless variety of conduct can be labeled 'speech' whenever
the person engaging in the conduct intends thereby to express
an idea" . 74
The four dissenting justices 75 in Barnes disagreed with
the majority's conclusion in finding that the regulation met
the requirement that the interest served is unrelated to the
suppression of free expression. They believed that the
pasties and G- string requirement was targeted at the message
conveyed by the dancers and therefore was not content -neutral
.
Most time, place and manner restrictions are deemed to be
content -neutral . For example, in Ward v. Rock Against
Racism16
,
the Court considered a New York law requiring
musical entertainers to use city-specified and city-operated
sound equipment in order to reduce disturbances to neighbors
The Court held that the law was aimed at minimizing undue
disturbances, not at the suppression of free expression.
13 Id. at 570, 111 S.Ct. at 2462.
74 Jd., citing O'Brien, 391 U.S. at 376, 88 S.Ct. at 1678
75White, Marshall, Blackmun and Stevens, JJ, dissenting
76491 U.S. 781, 109 S.Ct. 2746 (1989).
20
Therefore, the law was content -neutral, and was not
unconstitutional although it had an incidental adverse impact
on expression.
In Goldrush II, the Georgia Supreme Court held that the
City of Marietta's ordinance was content -neutral because it
was "justified without reference to the content of the
regulated speech". 77 "The principal inquiry in determining
whether the legislative act is content -neutral is whether the
government has adopted a regulation of speech because of
disagreement with the message it conveys". 78 The court held
that because the ordinance was enacted to combat the
undesirable secondary-effects of sexually explicit business it
was content -neutral . 79
ii. Secondary effects
In Goldrush II, the Court found that the City ordinance
was not aimed at the suppression of expression; rather, it was
an attempt to combat the negative secondary effects of adult
entertainment establishments. 80 The secondary effects of
sexually explicit businesses were said to be the increase in
71Goldrush II at 690, 482 S.E.2d at 355, citing Chambers
v. Peach County, 266 Ga. 318, 319, 467 S.E.2d 519 (1996)
.
78
'Goldrush II at 6 90, citing Ward v. Rock Against Racism,
491 U.S. 781, 791, 109 S . Ct . 2746, 2754, 105 L.Ed. 2d 661
(1989) .
79 Id. at 355.
80Goldrush II, 267 Ga. 683.
21
criminal activity and the depression of surrounding property-
values associated with such businesses.
In most cases, the regulation in question cites the
adverse secondary effects of the combination of alcohol and
nude entertainment as the purpose for the regulation. The
question that often arises is whether the government made a
sufficient finding of the adverse effects of the combination
of alcohol and nude entertainment as a basis for restrictions.
For example, in Sammy's of Mobile v. City of Mobile,
Alabama31 , the majority of the court held that "the ordinance
is aimed at the very type of harm found to create a
substantial government interest in LaRue, Barnes,
International Eateries82 and a host of other cases." 83
However, in a dissenting opinion Judge Kravitch stated that
"[t]he mere assertion, unsupported by any legislative
findings, that a city seeks to address the undesirable
secondary effects of a disfavored activity is insufficient to
justify a regulation that by its terms prohibits only conduct
that is protected by the First Amendment." 84 Nevertheless,
81140 F.3d 993 (11th Cir. 1998)
.
"International Eateries of America v. Broward County, 941
F.2d 1157, 1162 (11th Cir. 1991).
83 Id. at 997. See also City of Renton v. Playtime
Theatre, Inc., 475 U.S. 41 (1986); City of Newport v.
Iacobucci, 479 U.S. 1047, 107 S . Ct . 913, 93 L.Ed. 2d 862
(1987); Lanier v. City of Newton, 842 F.2d 253 (11th Cir.
1988), Grand Faloon Tavern, Inc. v. Wicker, 670 F.2d 943 (11th
Cir. 1982); Cafe 207, Inc. v. St. Johns County, 856 F.Supp.
641, 645 (M.D. Fla. 1994) .
84 Sammy's, 140 F.3d at 1008.
22
Judge Kravitch's view is clearly in the minority in federal
courts with the majority of cases following the majority's
opinion in Sammy's of Mobile. 85
The state courts in Georgia have not been as predictable
in addressing this issue. 86 For example, the debate over the
sufficiency of evidence of secondary effects arose in Club
Southern Burlesque, Inc. v. City of Carrol 1 ton61 . The Court
held that the City could rely on "evidence of pernicious
secondary effects of adult entertainment establishments as
found by studies commissioned by other municipalities and
counties". 88 Justice Sears dissented stating that the city
was required to offer probative evidence of the experience of
other municipalities and that it relied on their studies and
reports in passing the municipal ordinance. 89 She cited
Discoteque, Inc. v. City Council of Augusta 90
,
in support of
her position. In the Discoteque case, the trial court granted
summary judgment in favor of the city upon a challenge to an
ordinance regulating adult entertainment on premises licensed
to serve alcohol. The Supreme Court, with all justices
85See infra cases cited at footnote 74
.
86See, e.g., Quetgles v. City of Columbus, 268 Ga. 619,
491 S.E.2d 778 (1997); Chambers v. Peach County, 268 Ga. 672,
492 S.E.2d 191 (1997); Goldrush II v. City of Marietta, 267
Ga. 683, 482 S.E.2d 347 (1997)
.
87265 Ga. 528, 457 S.E.2d 816 (1995).
a8 Id. at 530, 457 S.E.2d at 818.
B9 Id.
90264 Ga. 623, 449 S.E.2d 608 (1994).
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concurring, reversed stating that a genuine issue of material
fact existed as to whether criminal activity and deterioration
of neighborhoods were, in fact, pernicious secondary effects
of adult entertainment businesses. However, in the later case
of Quetgles v. City of Columbus 91 , Justice Fletcher stated
that he believed the court made a mistake in Discoteque, Inc.
He would now hold, he stated, that the city had met its burden
of proving the secondary effects of adult entertainment
establishments
.
92
Again, in Secret Desires Lingerie, Inc. v. City of
Atlanta93
,
the Court struck down an ordinance regulating
lingerie modeling studios finding that the ordinance was
enacted without consideration of the pernicious secondary
effects of such businesses. There, Justices Fletcher and
Hunstein dissented stating that the trial court was correct in
finding the city relied on its own experience in enacting the
ordinance
.
94
Thus, for local government attorneys, the document
drafting and the procedural steps for enacting adult
entertainment ordinances becomes especially important. It
appears that if the local government carefully sets forth its
91264 Ga. 708, 450 S.E.2d 677 (1994); the City's amended
ordinance was decided in Quetgles v. City of Columbus, 268 Ga.
619, 491 S.E.2d 778 (1997)
.
92 Id.
93266 Ga. 760, 470 S.E.2d 879.
94 Id.; See also Chambers d/b/a/ "Neon Cowboy" v. Peach
County, 266 Ga. 318, 467 S.E.2d 519 (1996) .
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purpose of avoiding pernicious secondary effects and enacts
its adult entertainment laws accordingly, it has a better
chance of withstanding a constitutional challenge.
c. No Greater Than Essential to Further Government
Interest
The Georgia Supreme Court has struck down ordinances that
were not narrowly drawn to further the government ' s interest
in preventing the illegal activity associated with adult
entertainment establishments offering nude dancing and
alcohol. In Gravely v. Bacon9S , the plaintiff claimed the
City of Smyrna's ordinance failed to meet the third prong of
the Paramount test "because the ordinance is not narrowly
drawn to exclude mainstream entertainment, such as the opera
"Salome", the play "Hair", or nude ballet". 96 The Court
rejected the argument holding that "the ordinance's incidental
restriction on the protected expression of nude dancing at
adult entertainment establishments is no greater than is
essential to protect the government's interest in preventing
unwanted secondary effects". 97 The Court stated that a
narrow construction does not prohibit the live performances of
plays, operas or ballets.
95863 Ga. 203, 429 S.E.2d 663 (1993); see also Yarbrough
v. City of Carrollton, 262 Ga. 444, 421 S.E.2d 72 (1992);
Harris v. Entertainment Systems, Inc., 259 Ga. 701, 386 S.E.2d
140 (1989) .
96 Id. at 205, 429 S.E.2d at 665.
91 Id. at 207, 429 S.E.2d at 666.
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In Pel Assoc, v. Joseph98 , the Court held that the
ordinance in question failed to limit the ban on partial nude
dancing to public places that cause the undesirable secondary
effects." The Gravely Court distinguished the ordinance at
issue in Pel Assoc, stating that the ordinance in Pel Assoc.
extended to private conduct and public entertainment involving
live performances such as television shows, motion pictures
and museums
.
In S.J.T., Inc. v. Richmond County100
,
the plaintiff
argued the ordinance was violative of due process because
there was no rational connection between the ordinance
provisions and the secondary effects sought to be avoided by
the ordinance. The Court rejected the plaintiff's arguments,
found a rational connection, and stated that the law was no
greater than essential to further the government's interest in
combatting pernicious secondary effects.
Justice Sears-Collins dissented in S.J.T., Inc., Gravely
and other cases. 101 She stated in Goldrush II and in
Chambers v. Peach County102 , that the owners of adult
98262 Ga. 904, 427 S.E.2d 264 (2993).
"Id. at 905-906.
100263 Ga. 267, 430 S.E.2d 726 (1993)
.
101See Club Southern Burlesque, Inc. v. City of
Carrollton, 265 Ga. 528, 457 S.E.2d 816 (1995); Quetgles v.
City of Columbus, 268 Ga. 619, 491 S.E.2d 778 (1997); Quetgles
v. City of Columbus, 264 Ga. 708, 450 S.E.2d 677
(1994) (concurring on other grounds)
.
102268 Ga. 672, 492 S.E.2d 191 (1997)
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entertainment businesses had vested property rights which the
government had improperly infringed upon. In Chambers, she
stated, "I hope that this Court will one day take a more
enlightened view of property rights of the citizens of this
State". 103 She argues that adult entertainment ordinances
should be treated like zoning ordinances for purposes of
determining vested rights. 104 However, no other members of
the Court share Justice Sears-Collins' view.
IV. Conclusion
Given that Justice Sears-Collins argued that adult
entertainment ordinances should be treated like zoning
ordinances, she must not have been familiar with the L'Hote
zoning ordinance. 105 If the Court considered adult
entertainment ordinances under the "taking" principles of the
Fifth Amendment, the results probably would not be different
than they have been under either the Twenty- first Amendment or
the First Amendment. It is not likely that the Courts will
take Justice Sears-Collins' "more enlightened view" in the
future given that such a view has not developed since the
L'Hote case. The Courts have made clear their propensity to
uphold properly drawn adult entertainment ordinances. The
103 Jd. at 675, 492 S.E.2d at 193.
10iGoldrush II, 267 Ga. 683.
105See infra text at footnote 1. The L'Hote case predated
by 26 years Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S.
65, 47 S.Ct. 114 (1926) (establishing the zoning concept as a
reasonable and proper use of police power)
.
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Courts' analysis under First Amendment principles make clear
the importance (at least on the part of local governments) of
drafting the ordinances and following a rational process in
enacting the ordinances.
CHAPTER TWO
SIGNS AND BILLBOARDS
I. Introduction
Commercial speech, like libel and obscenity, was
traditionally viewed as being outside the scope of First
Amendment protection. 106 But, in 1976, the Court formally
abandoned that view and held that even commercial speech is
entitled to First Amendment protection. 107 However,
commercial speech is not entitled to the same full range of
First Amendment protection as noncommercial speech. Rather,
commercial speech is given "a limited measure of protection,
commensurate with its subordinate position in the scale of
First Amendment values, while allowing modes of regulation
that might be impermissible in the realm of noncommercial
expression. " 108
106Valentine v. Chrestensen, 316 U.S. 52, 62 S . Ct . 920, 86
L.Ed. 1260 (1942)
.
107Virginia Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens
Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 96 S . Ct . 1817, 48
L.Ed. 2d 346 (1976); see also City of Doraville v. Turner
Communications Corp., 236 Ga. 385, 223 S.E.2d 798 (1976).
108Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447, 456, 98
S.Ct. 1912, 1919, 56 L.Ed. 2d 444 (1978).
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In Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public Service
Commission of New York109 , the Court adopted a four-part test
for evaluating the constitutionality of governmental
regulation of commercial speech. 110 The regulation of
political, ideological or other noncommercial speech is
subject to the O'Brien111 test.
Although they may contain either commercial or
noncommercial expression, signs and billboards are often
subject to regulations that do not provide for the
distinction, thereby unconstitutionally protecting commercial
speech over noncommercial speech. Local governing authorities
apparently have a preference for on-site signs and a degree of
disdain for off -site signs; the regulations often allow on-
site and ban off -site signs.
Unfortunately, Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego112
is the leading case on the regulation of signs and billboards.
This is unfortunate because the Court rendered a plurality
opinion which Justice Rehnquist called "a virtual Tower of
Babel from which no definitive principles can be clearly
drawn" 113 . Moreover, the Court has not taken advantage of an
opportunity to clarify the Metromedia decision since it was
109447 U.S. 557, 100 S . Ct . 2343, 65 L.Ed. 2d 341 (1980).
110See infra discussion at Section Ila.
11XU.S. v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 88 S . Ct . 1673, 20 L.Ed.
2d 672 (1968); see infra discussion at Section III.
112453 U.S. 490, 101 S . Ct . 2882, 69 L.Ed. 2d 800 (1981).
113453 U.S. at 569, 101 S . Ct . at 2924.
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rendered in 1981 even though a perfect opportunity was
presented in South.la.ke Property Associates , Ltd. v. City of
Morrow11*. The Court denied the application for
certiorari . 115
The courts have found traffic safety and aesthetics to be
valid governmental interests to justify sign regulations. 116
Regulations prohibiting commercial signs in historic districts
have been upheld. 117 Although some jurisdictions have
allowed ordinances that place greater restrictions on the use
of portable or temporary signs than on permanent signs,
Georgia courts generally have not. Georgia courts have struck
down such ordinances citing failure to prove how the law
furthered the stated interests in traffic safety and
aesthetics. 118
II. Commercial Speech
Since purely commercial speech was not traditionally
entitled to any First Amendment protection, commercial
advertisement could be subjected to governmental regulation in
114112 F. 3d 1114 (11th Cir. 1997); cert, denied U.S
119 S. Ct. 60, 142 L.Ed. 2d 47 (1998)
.
115Id.
116See infra text at Section V.a.
117See infra text at Section V.b.
118See infra text at Section V.c.
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the same way as any other type of business activity. 119 In
1976, the U.S. Supreme Court reversed that view. In Virginia
Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council,
Inc. 120 , the Court held that no state may completely suppress
the dissemination of truthful information about an entirely
lawful activity merely because it is fearful of that
information's effect upon its recipients. 121 In applying the
First Amendment, the Court has rejected the "highly
paternalistic" view that the government has complete power to
suppress or regulate speech. "People will perceive their own
best interests if only they are well enough informed, and . .
.
the best means to that end is to open the channels of
communication rather than to close them". 122 The U.S.
Supreme Court has held commercial advertising, in the form of
signs or billboards, to be "commercial speech" which falls
within the scope of First Amendment protection if the
advertising concerns a lawful activity and is not false or
119Valentine v. Chrestensen, 316 U.S. 52, 62 S . Ct . 920, 86
L.Ed. 1260 (1942)
.
120425 U.S. 748, 96 S . Ct . 1817, 48 L.Ed. 2d 346 (1976)
(Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (arguing that First Amendment was
designed to protect discussion of political, social or other
public issues, rather than commercial speech)
.
121 Id.
122Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public Service
Commission of New York, 447 U.S. 557, 562, 100 S . Ct . 2343,
2349, 65 L.Ed. 2d 341 (1980) quoting Virginia Pharmacy, 425
U.S. at 770, 96 S . Ct . at 1829; see also Linmark Associates,
Inc. v. Willingboro, 431 U.S. 85, 92, 97 S . Ct . 1614, 1618, 50
L.Ed. 2d 155 (1977) .
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deceptive. 123 The Georgia Supreme Court also recognized the
government's limited authority to regulate signs and
billboards in City of Doraville v. Turner Communications
Corpora ti on . 124
The courts have recognized a distinction between the
First Amendment protection of commercial speech and
noncommercial speech. The regulation of noncommercial speech,
such as political and/or ideological speech, is more strictly
scrutinized. 125 In Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v.
Public Service Commission of New York126 , the U.S. Supreme
Court held: "the Constitution . . . accords a lesser protection
to commercial speech than to other constitutionally guaranteed
expression. The protection available for a particular
commercial expression turns on the nature both of the
expression and of the governmental interests served by its
regulation." 127 Nevertheless, such First Amendment
protection does not necessarily prohibit the regulation of
123Bates v. State Bar of Arizona, 433 U.S. 350, 97 S . Ct
.
2691, 53 L.Ed. 2d 810 (1977) ; Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar
Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447, 98 S . Ct . 1912, 56 L.Ed. 2d 444 (1978);
Young v. American Mini Theatres, Inc. 42 7 U.S. 50, 96 S . Ct
2440, 49 L.Ed. 2d 310 (1976)
.
124236 Ga. 385, 223 S.E.2d 798 (1976)
125See infra text at section III.
126447 U.S. 557, 100 S . Ct . 2343, 65 L.Ed. 2d 341 (1980)
121Id. at 562-63, 100 S . Ct . at 2349-50. See also
Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego, 453 U.S. 490, 507, 101
S.Ct. 2882, 2892, 69 L.Ed. 2d 800 (1981)
.
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commercial expression if the restrictions are content -neutral
and serve as a reasonable time, place or manner restriction.
a. The Central Hudson Test.
The Central Hudson Court adopted a four-part test for
evaluating the constitutionality of governmental regulation of
commercial speech. Accordingly, (1) the First Amendment
protects commercial speech only if that speech concerns lawful
activity and is not misleading; (2) a restriction on
otherwise protected commercial speech is valid only if it
seeks to implement a substantial governmental interest, (3)
directly advances that interest, and (4) reaches no further
than necessary to accomplish the given objective. 128 The
Court found that the regulation failed the four part test.
The case involved a ban on promotional advertising by electric
utilities. The stated purpose of the regulation was to
conserve energy.
i. Neither misleading nor unlawful.
The Central Hudson Court rejected the New York Court of
Appeals' argument that since the gas company held a monopoly,
its speech was not protected. The New York court "saw no
constitutional problem with barring commercial speech that it
viewed as conveying little useful information". 129 The Court
held that even in monopoly markets, the suppression of
advertising reduces the information available for consumer
12SId.
129Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 567, 100 S . Ct . at 2352
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decisions and thereby defeats the purpose of the First
Amendment. 130 Rather, the analysis depends on whether the
speech concerns a lawful activity and is not misleading. The
Court noted that the government may ban forms of communication
more likely to deceive the public than to inform it. 131
However, it found that since the regulated speech was neither
misleading nor did it involve unlawful activity, it was
protected by the First Amendment. 132
ii. A substantial governmental interest.
The second prong of the test requires a review of whether
a restriction on commercial speech "seeks to implement a
substantial governmental interest". 133 The Central Hudson
Court found that the government's interest in energy
conservation was substantial. The governing authority must
show the governmental interest intended to be advanced, either
through the ordinance itself, in a purpose clause, or through
extrinsic evidence. 134 The court will not speculate what
130 Id.
121Id. at 563, S.Ct. at 2350; see also Ohralik v. Ohio
State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447, 464-465, 98 S.Ct. 1912, 1923-
1925, 56 L.Ed. 2d 444 (1978); Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Human
Relations Comm'n, 413 U.S. 376, 388, 93 S.Ct. 2553, 2560, 37
L.Ed. 2d 669 (1973)
.
132Central Hudson, 44 7 U.S. 557.
133 Jd.
134Southlake Property Associates, Ltd. v. City of Morrow,
112 F. 3d 1114 (11th Cir. 1997) cert, denied U.S.
,
119
S.Ct. 60, 142 L.Ed. 2d 147 (1998); Dills v. City of Marietta,
674 F.2d 1377 (11th Cir. 1982); Adams Outdoor v. Fulton
County, 738 F.Supp. 1431 (N.D. Ga. 1990); Rhodes v. Gwinnett
County, 557 F.Supp. 30 (N.D. Ga . 1982); Union City Board of
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purpose is to be served. For example, in Adams Outdoor
Advertising of Atlanta, Inc. v. Fulton County133 , and in
Rhodes v. Gwinnett County136 , the ordinances neither stated
a purpose, provided any statement of findings, nor otherwise
articulated a governmental interest. In those cases, it
arguably would have been logical for the court to infer the
interests of traffic safety and aesthetics, but the court
refused to make such inferences.
In Southlake Property Associates, Ltd. v. City of Morrow,
Ga. 131
,
Southlake Associates challenged the City of Morrow's
ban on billboards asserting that the city failed the second
prong of the test by failing to articulate a significant
governmental interest. 138 The Court rejected the argument
and stated that the ordinance's purpose clause cited the twin
goals of traffic safety and the appearance of the city.
Southlake followed the general rule that if an ordinance
states that its purpose is to address traffic safety and
Zoning Adjustment v. Justice Outdoor Displays, 266 Ga. 3 93,
467 S.E. 2d 875 (1996); Krueger v. City of Pensacola, 759 F.
2d 851 (11th Cir. 1985) ; Leverett v. City of Pinellas Park,
775 F. 2d 1536 (11th Cir. 1985); Chambers v. Peach County, 266
Ga. 318, 467 S.E. 2d 519 (1996)
.
135138 F.Supp. 1431, 1432 (N.D. Ga . 1990) .
136557 F.Supp. 30 (N.D. Ga. 1982) .
137112 F.3d 1114 (11th Cir. 1997); cert, denied. U.S.
,
119 S.Ct. 60, 142 L.Ed. 2d 47 (1998).
138 Id. at 1116
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aesthetics, then it will be deemed sufficient proof of a
significant governmental interest. 139
iii. Directly advancing the interest.
The Central Hudson Court found the regulation to directly-
advance the government interest. The Court found a connection
between advertising and demand for electricity. 140 The Court
held that the state's interest in energy conservation was
directly advanced by the regulation. 141
Georgia courts generally have not allowed ordinances that
place greater restrictions on the use of portable or temporary
signs than on permanent signs because of their failure to
prove that the restrictions directly advanced the stated
interests in traffic safety and aesthetics. 142 In Dimmitt v.
City of Clearwater, 1^ the 11th Circuit held the "meager
evidence" that the restriction on graphic expression advanced
the city' s interests in aesthetics and traffic safety was
insufficient to justify exempting only government flags.
139 Xd. at 1116, citing Metromedia, Inc. v. San Diego, 453
U.S. 490, 507-08, 101 S. Ct . 2882, 2892-93, 69 L. Ed. 2d 800
(1981) .
140Central Hudson, 447 at 569, 100 S . Ct . at 2353.
141Id.
li2See infra text at Section V.c.
143985 F.2d 1565 (11th Cir. 1993) .
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iv. Reaches no further than necessary to accomplish the
given objective.
When applying the fourth part of the test, the Central
Hudson Court found that the regulation reached further than
necessary to meet the objectives. The Court held that the
regulation prevented utilities from promoting the use of
electricity even in situations where electricity could be a
more efficient power source. Since the advertising ban was
more extensive than necessary, it was invalid under the First
Amendment
.
144
Since the Central Hudson case, the Court has invalidated
regulations that are not a "reasonable fit" under the fourth
prong of the test. For example, in City of Cincinnati v.
Discovery Network1* 5 , the Court struck down Cincinnati's ban
of commercial newsracks as not being a reasonable fit under
part four of the Central Hudson test. The ordinance applied
to advertising materials but not to newspapers. The Court, in
applying the Central Hudson test, stated "if there are
numerous and obvious less -burdensome alternatives to the
restriction on commercial speech, that is certainly a relevant
consideration in determining whether the fit between the ends
and means is reasonable" 146 . The Court held the ordinance to
144447 U.S. 557, 100 S . Ct . 2343, 65 L.Ed. 2d 341 (1980).
145507 U.S. 410 (1993) .
146 Id. at 418, 113 S.Ct. at 1510
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be impermissible because the ban achieved only a marginal
degree of protection for the city's asserted interests.
III. Noncommercial Speech.
The Central Hudson Court recognized that commercial
speech may be regulated in situations where noncommercial
speech may not. In U.S. v. O'Brien1 * 1 , the Court established
the following balancing test for content -neutral regulation of
noncommercial speech, including such speech expressed in the
form of signs or billboards. Such a regulation is
constitutional if it: (1) is within the constitutional power
of the government; (2) directly furthers a sufficiently
substantial governmental interest; (3) that is unrelated to
the suppression of expression; and (4) any incidental
restriction on freedom of expression is no greater than
necessary to accomplish the governmental interest. 148 Thus,
an intermediate level of scrutiny is applied in cases
involving noncommercial speech.
The O'Brien test was applied in City Council of Los
Angeles v. Taxpayers for Vincent149
,
which involved a local
ordinance prohibiting the posting of private commercial and
noncommercial signs on public property. The Court held that
the city' s interests in traffic safety and aesthetics were
147391 U.S. 367, 88 S . Ct . 1673, 20 L.Ed. 2d 672 (1968)
148 Id.
14 9466 U.S. 789, 104 S . Ct . 2118, 80 L.Ed. 2d 772 (1984)
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legitimate and sufficiently substantial to justify the
ordinance. The Court further found that the ordinance's
incidental restriction on noncommercial speech was no greater
than necessary to accomplish the city's objectives and that
the regulation left open ample alternative modes of
communication for noncommercial speech. 150
Whether the regulation bans a form of noncommercial
expression for which ample alternative modes of communication
do not exist is an important factor considered by the Court in
applying the balancing test. However, a restriction on
protected expression cannot be justified solely on the basis
that alternative channels of communication exist for such
expression. Rather, the four part test is applied and the
question of alternative modes of communication is
addressed. 151
The U.S. Supreme Court has suggested that an absolute ban
on residential signs would be held to be unconstitutional. 152
In City of Ladue v. Gilleo153
,
the Court invalidated a city
ordinance which imposed a general ban on signs but which
contained some exemptions, including "For sale" signs. The
150Id.
151Minarcini v. Strongsville City School District, 541
F.2d 577, 582 (6th Cir. 1976); Southern Productions, Ltd. v.
Conrad, 420 U.S. 546, 556, 95 S . Ct . 1239, 43 L.Ed. 2d 448
(1975) .
152City of Ladue v. Gilleo, 510 U.S. 809, 114 S . Ct . 2038,
126 L.Ed. 2d 24 (1994) .
153510 U.S. 809, 114 S.Ct. 2038, 126 L.Ed. 2d 24 (1994)
.
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Court held that since the exemptions were content -based and
failed to provide for a meaningful alternative mode of
communication, the regulation was unconstitutional.
Similarly, the Supreme Court of Georgia, in Union City Board
of Zoning Appeals v. Justice Outdoor Displays, Inc. 154 , found
restrictions on noncommercial messages and political signs to
be unconstitutional. In Union City, the court rejected: (1)
a restriction on the display of noncommercial messages at
locations where commercial messages were permitted; (2)
restrictions on content-based signs in residential
neighborhoods; and (3) a seven-week time limitation on
political signs, finding that such a durational limitation
does not withstand strict scrutiny. 155 Citing Ladue, the
Court recognized "the unique and significant means of
expression which residential signs provide". 156 The Court
noted the "record does not demonstrate that Union City has
provided any alternate medium of expression significantly
equivalent to residential signs". 157
IV. Of f -premise and On-Premise Sign Distinctions.
Although it appears that local governing authorities
often find signs and billboards to be offensive, they seem to
154266 Ga. 393, 467 S.E.2d 875 (1996) .
155 Id.
156 Id. at 398, 467 S.E. 2d at 880.
157266 Ga. at 399, 467 S.E. 2d at 881.
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sympathetically recognize a commercial need for signage on the
site of a commercial establishment. Even if their intentions
are arguably honorable, it is the effort to provide for signs
in some situations while prohibiting them in others that
causes the provisions to run afoul of constitutional
limitations. The problem arises when an ordinance bans off-
site signs (billboards) and attempts to restrict on-site signs
to advertising the business located at that site. Such
limitations are generally an unconstitutional restriction on
noncommercial speech. For example, the U.S. Supreme Court in
Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego158 , struck down an
ordinance that allowed on-site commercial signs because it
restricted on-site political or ideological signs.
The ordinance in Metromedia forbade all outdoor
advertising display signs except (1) on-premise signs such as
those designating the name of the owner or occupant of the
premises, or identifying the premises, or advertising the
goods or services rendered on the premises upon which the sign
was placed, and (2) specific categories of off -site signs.
The stated purpose of the ordinance was "to eliminate hazards
to pedestrians and motorists brought about by distracting sign
displays" 159
,
and "to preserve and improve the appearance of
the city". 160 The plurality of the Court did not find the
158453 U.S. 490, 101 S . Ct . 2882, 69 L.Ed. 2d 800 (1981)
159453 U.S. at 493, 101 S . Ct . at 2885.
160 Id.
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ordinance to be unconstitutional because it suppressed
commercial speech. Rather, its flaw was that it favored
commercial signs over noncommercial signs by permitting on-
site signs in the manner that it did. The plurality also
found that limited exceptions allowing certain kinds of
noncommercial billboards but not others rendered the law
invalid. Further, the Court rejected the argument that the
ordinance was a reasonable time, place and manner restriction
because it was not content -neutral and it did not leave open
satisfactory alternative channels of communication. 161
The plurality found traffic safety and aesthetics to be
valid governmental interests. Justice Brennan, in his
concurring opinion, stated that there was no evidence
demonstrating that billboards actually impair traffic safety
in San Diego. The ordinance failed to show that its asserted
interest in traffic safety and aesthetics was sufficiently
substantial
.
162
The dissenting justices, Chief Justice Burger, Justice
Stevens, and Justice Rehnquist, argued that the aesthetic
justification for the ordinance alone was sufficient and that
a legislature should not be required to convince a "judge that
161453 U.S. 490, 101 S . Ct . 2882, 69 L.Ed. 2d 800 (1981);
citing Virginia Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens
Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748 (1976) and Linmark Associates,
Inc. v. Willingboro, 431 U.S. 85 (1977)
.
162Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego, 453 U.S. 4 90,
536-37 (1981) (Brennan, J. , concurring) .
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the elimination of billboards would have more than a
negligible impact on aesthetics". 163
In 1997 the 11th Circuit Court of Appeals decided the
Southlake Associates164 case. The City of Morrow's ordinance
did not prohibit on-premise signs, but it prohibited
billboards which it defined as:
advertising sign or a sign which advertises a
commodity, product, service, activity or any other
person, place or thing, which is not located,
found, or sold on the premises upon which such sign
is located; usually found along or near major
roadways and of such size as to catch the attention
of the motoring public and may sometimes be
illuminated or animated. 165
The District Court held that since the ordinance made no
distinction between commercial and noncommercial speech, that
both commercial and noncommercial speech was included within
the definition of billboard. As such, the ordinance
prohibited all billboards bearing noncommercial messages in
the City of Morrow. The 11th Circuit disagreed with this
interpretation.
The District Court upheld the ordinance banning off -site
noncommercial signs relying on Messer v. City of
Douglasville166 . In reviewing the District Court's decision,
the 11th Circuit Court noted that the ordinance in the Messer
163453 U.S. at 570, 101 S . Ct . at 2925
164112 F. 3d 1114 (11th Cir. 1997); cert, denied U.S
.,
119 S. Ct. 60, 142 L.Ed. 2d 47 (1998).
16SId. at 1115.
166 975 F.2d 1505 (11th Cir. 1992
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case was upheld because it was limited to the historic
district in Douglasville and was sufficiently narrowly-
drawn. 167 The Court stated that it has reiterated that the
prohibition of billboards to a limited area of the city was a
factor in their decision. 168 Although the 11th Circuit
upheld the ordinance, it did not rely on the Messer case and
disagreed with the District Court's analysis.
In upholding the ordinance, the 11th Circuit determined
that noncommercial speech was not, in fact, regulated by the
ordinance. The Court recognized two distinct interpretations
of whether off -premise billboard sign ordinances regulate
noncommercial speech. One view holds that there is no
content -based regulation because noncommercial speech is
always where the speaker is located. Accordingly, all
noncommercial speech is "on-premise" . The other view is that
when an on-premise regulation only allows messages relating to
the property, noncommercial messages are prohibited. The
attorney for Southlake Associates argued that under the City
of Morrow's ordinance, noncommercial speech is prohibited in
most situations. 169 For example, a sign such as "Give to the
167112 F.3d at 1117, citing Messer v. Douglasville, 975
F.2d at 1511.
168 Citing Dimmitt v. City of Clearwater, 985 F.2d 1565,
1569 n.4 (11th Cir. 1993)
.
169Mark W. Forsling, After Southlake Property: Settling
the Confusion Over the Location of Billboards Containing
Noncommercial Speech, 28 Stetson L.Rev. 721 (1999) (Mark W.
Forsling, Schreeder Wheeler & Flint, was attorney for
plaintiff -appellant)
.
45
United Way" in front of a shopping center would be prohibited
because the United Way was not located at the shopping center.
Read literally, he argued, the ordinance banned such
noncommercial speech unconstitutionally.
The 11th Circuit Court followed the former view that
noncommercial speech is where the speaker is located, based
primarily on the facts of the case. The City argued that its
ordinance did not prohibit off -site signs bearing
noncommercial messages and that in three years it had never
been interpreted as disallowing noncommercial speech.
Although the city acknowledged that the ordinance defined
"billboard" broadly, it argued that its interpretation had
been narrowed to allow noncommercial messages. 170 The Court
stated that "[a]n idea, unlike a product, may be viewed as
located wherever the idea is expressed, i.e., wherever the
speaker is located. Under this alternative view, all
noncommercial speech is on-site. A sign bearing a
noncommercial message is on-site wherever the speaker places
it". 171 The court reasoned that a billboard would not
include a sign carrying a noncommercial message under the City
of Morrow's ordinance.
In 1996, in Union City Board of Zoning Appeals v. Justice
Outdoor Displays, Inc. 172
, the Georgia Supreme Court
170112 F.3d at 1117.
171112 F.3d at 1118.
172266 Ga. 393, 467 S.E.2d 875 (1996) .
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invalidated an ordinance that was similar to the ordinance in
Metromedia.. The Court held that the Union City ordinance
impermissibly favored some signs based on their content by
limiting on-premise signs to certain messages. The Union City
ordinance allowed commercial messages "on-site" but
effectively prohibited on-site noncommercial messages. The
ordinance defined "off -premise signs" and "on-premise signs"
as follows:
an "of f -premise sign" is a sign, other than a
special sign or a temporary sign, which identifies,
advertises, or promotes a product, service, person,
place, activity, event, idea, or any other thing
located or obtainable elsewhere other than the lot
where such sign is located and not principally sold
on the lot on which it is located.
an "on-premise sign" is defined as a sign, other
than a special sign or temporary sign, which iden-
tifies, advertises, or promotes a product, service,
person, place, activity, event, idea or any other
thing located or obtainable on or at the lot where
such sign is located. 173
The Court, citing Metromedia, found that the ordinance allowed
the property owner to advertise certain commercial messages,
but he or she was prohibited from displaying most noncommer-
cial messages. Since the on-site/of f -site distinction allowed
commercial messages while disallowing noncommercial messages,
the Court found it to be unconstitutional.
113 Union City, 266 Ga. 393, 394, 467 S.E.2d 875, 878
(1996) .
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V. Some specific types of regulations,
a. Aesthetic considerations
Some early court decisions invalidated zoning and other
laws regulating signs and billboards on the ground that the
restrictions were based on aesthetic considerations, which
were deemed beyond the scope of police power regulation. 174
For example, the Georgia Supreme Court, in Thomas v. City of
Marietta175 , held that although aesthetics have an important
incidental effect on regulations, standing alone, aesthetics
are not enough to support sign ordinance legislation under the
police power.
However, aesthetics have become recognized as a legiti-
mate police power consideration. In Corey Outdoor Advertis-
ing, Inc. v. Board of Zoning Adjustments of City of Atlan-
ta116 , citing Gouge v. City of Snellville111 , the court held
that even zoning based merely on aesthetic interest is a
reasonable and proper exercise of the city's police power.
Similarly, in Taxpayers for Vincent11 *, Metromedia, 179 and
174Rathkopf
,
The Law Of Zoning & Planning, § 14A.02.
175245 Ga. 485, 265 S.E.2d 775, cert, denied 449 U.S. 839
(1980) (ordinance upheld on other grounds)
.
176327 S.E. 2d 178, 254 Ga . 221, appeal dismissed, 106 S.
Ct. 33, 88 L. Ed. 2d 27.
177249 Ga. 91, 287 S.E. 2d 539 (1982) .
178466 U.S. 789, 80 L. Ed. 2d 77, 104 S. Ct . 2118 (1984).
179453 U.S. 490, 101 S . Ct . 2882, 69 L.Ed. 2d 800 (1981)
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Southlake180 , the courts have held that a state may legiti-
mately exercise its police power in advance of aesthetics. 181
b. Historic area restrictions
Generally, content -neutral restrictions on signs and
billboards in restricted areas such as historic districts will
be deemed valid time, place, and manner restrictions.
In Messer v. City of Douglasville182 , the City enacted
an ordinance that prohibited off -premise signs in a historic
district . The Court found that it did not favor noncommercial
over commercial speech. Noting that the government may
legitimately exercise its police power to advance aesthetic
interests, the Court said " [a] government has more significant
interest in the aesthetics of designated historical areas than
in other areas". 183 In upholding the ordinance, the Court
further noted that it was sufficiently narrowly drawn and left
open alternative modes of communication.
180112 F.3d 114 (11th Cir. 1997), cert, denied U.S
.,
119 S.Ct. 60, 142 L.Ed. 2d 47 (1998) .
181Id. ; jbut see Dimmitt v. City of Clearwater, 985 F.2d
1565 (11th Cir. 1993) (the "meager evidence" that the restric-
tion on graphic expression advanced the city's interests in
aesthetics and traffic safety was insufficient to justify
exempting only government flags)
.
182 975 F.2d 1505 (11th Cir. 1992)
.
183 Id. at 1510, citing Penn Central Transportation Co. v.
New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 107-108, 98 S.Ct. 2646, 2651, 57
L.Ed. 2d 631 (1978) .
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In Corey Outdoor Advertising, Inc. v. Board of Zoning
Adjustments of City of Atlanta164 , the court upheld an ordi-
nance which prohibited general advertising signs within 3 00
feet of the boundaries of historical sites.
c. Portable sign restrictions.
Some jurisdictions have allowed ordinances that place
greater restrictions on the use of portable or temporary signs
than on permanent signs. 185 However, Georgia courts have
required proof that such restrictions directly advance the
claimed interest in traffic safety or aesthetics. For
example, in Rhodes v. Gwinnett County166 , the district court
struck down a county zoning ordinance which restricted
portable signs holding that the restriction did not directly
advance the claimed government interest in either traffic
safety or aesthetics. Again, in Dills v. Cobb County187 , the
district court struck down a county ordinance that required
portable signs to be set back from a building set-back line.
The court held the county failed to meet its burden of proving
that the ordinance furthered its interests in traffic safety
or aesthetics.
184327 S.E.2d 178, 254 Ga . 221 (1985) .
185Rathkopf, The Law Of Zoning & Planning, § 14A-18(c) .
186557 F.Supp. 30 (N.D. Ga . 1982).
187593 F.Supp. 170 (N.D. Ga . 1984), aff'd 755 F.2d 1473
(11th Cir. 1985) .
50
VI . Conclusion
Generally, when sign and billboard ordinances regulate
commercial speech, the Central Hudson four-part test is
applied; and when sign and billboard ordinances regulate
noncommercial speech, the O'Brien test is applied. The
question unanswered by the U.S. Supreme Court is whether
noncommercial speech can ever be considered located off -site;
or, the alternative view, is noncommercial speech always
located at the same site as the "speaker"? The 11th Circuit
has adopted the latter view that noncommercial speech is
always where the speaker is located, and therefore, on-site.
The U.S. Supreme Court provided little guidance in the
Metromedia case. The plurality did not determine whether
ordinances that generally prohibit off-site signs but allow
on-site signs are facially invalid because they ban noncommer-
cial speech while allowing commercial speech. The Court
should announce a uniform rule of interpretation from which
definitive principles can clearly be drawn regarding the
regulation of signs and billboards.
CHAPTER THREE
THE FREE EXERCISE CLAUSE
I. Introduction
Local governments are allowed broad discretion in
enacting zoning regulations. The power to enact zoning
regulations falls within the general welfare power, or the
power to provide for the health, safety and welfare of the
citizens. 188 Therefore, when challenged, the government
merely needs to meet a rational relationship test. However,
when zoning regulations impact religious uses, the presumption
of constitutionality should be reversed. But, the extent to
which local governments are restricted from regulating
religious uses is not yet clear. The U.S. Supreme Court has
provided little guidance in spite of the recent opportunity to
do so in City of Boerne v. P.F. Flores . 189
188See 2 Dill. Mun. Corp. 928, §591, "If the ordinance is
not inherently unfair, unreasonable or oppressive, the person
attacking it must assume the burden of affirmatively showing
that as applied to him it is unreasonable, unfair or oppres-
sive. Id. ; See also Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co.,
272 U.S. 365, 395, 47 S. Ct . 114, 71 L.E. 303 (1926) .
189521 U.S. 507, 117 S. Ct . 2157, 138 L.Ed. 2d 624 (1997) .
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The Boerne Court struck down an act passed by Congress as
unconstitutional stating that Congress had exceeded its
powers. The Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993 190
("RFRA") , which established a compelling governmental interest
test for governmental intrusion, including land use regula-
tions involving religious institutions, prompted the filing of
a number of zoning cases before its demise in 1997. If RFRA
had been upheld, it is likely that more land use regulation
matters involving religious uses would have been filed in
federal courts.
Land use regulation matters are often brought in state
courts and the approach by state courts varies widely. For
example, New York has been very protective of religious uses.
The New York courts indicate that the usual concerns about
traffic congestion and effects on property values do not apply
to religious uses. The majority-view cases tend to reverse
the presumption of constitutionality accorded land use
regulations
.
A minority of courts do not. In California, for example,
courts will allow the exclusion of churches from residential
areas based on arguments of traffic congestion and property
values. In Georgia, the courts have followed the California
position.
190Pub. L. No. 103-104. 107 Stat. 1488 (1993) (codified at
42 U.S.C. §§2000bb et seg. )
.
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II. The United States Supreme Court
The First Amendment to the United States Constitution
states: "Congress shall make no law respecting an establish-
ment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise there-
of. . . ." 191 In 1963, the Supreme Court in Sherbert v.
Verner, 192 enunciated a compelling state interest test and
pointed out that a state law was valid if it did not infringe
upon the free exercise of religion, or if it did, that it was
justified only by a compelling state interest. The Sherbert
case involved a South Carolina law which required unemployment
compensation claimants to be available for work on Saturday.
The plaintiff was a member of the Seventh-Day Adventist Church
and refused to work on Saturday. Therefore, she was ineligi-
ble for benefits. Applying the compelling governmental
interest test, the court struck down the South Carolina law
and held that South Carolina may not constitutionally apply
the eligibility provisions so as to constrain a worker to
abandon his religious convictions respecting the day of rest.
The general framework was applied to a number of cases after
Sherbert. However, in 1990, in Employment Division v.
Smith, 192 the Court adopted a narrow view of the free exercise
clause of the first amendment.
191U . S . Const . amend . I
.
192374 U.S. 398, 83 S. Ct . 1790, 10 L.Ed. 2d 965 (1963).
193494 U.S. 872, 110 S. Ct . 1595, 108 L.Ed. 2d 876 (1989)
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a. The Smith Test.
In Employment Division v. Smith194 , the Court held that
"neutral", generally applicable laws" are exempt from consti-
tutional scrutiny, even if they prohibit or substantially
burden religious exercise. 195 The case involved two workers
who were fired from their jobs because they ingested peyote
for sacramental purposes at a ceremony of the Native American
Church. The Court distinguished this case from Sherbert on
the ground that Sherbert did not involve conduct that had been
made illegal. The Smith Court held that "if prohibiting the
exercise of religion ... is not the object . . . but merely the
incidental effect of a generally applicable and otherwise
valid provision, the First Amendment has not been offend-
ed." 196 Thus, according to Smith, the compelling interest
test is not applicable.
The Court had an opportunity to apply the Smith test in
a police power (but not zoning) case in Church of the Lukumi
Babalu Aye v. City of Hialeah. 191 The case involved a church
that practiced religion employing animal sacrifice. The City
of Hialeah adopted ordinances stating its concern was with
practices that were "inconsistent with public morals, peace,
or safety" and the ordinance prohibited religious acts of such
194 Jd.
19S Id. at 877, S. Ct. at 1600.
196494 U.S. at 877. 110 S. Ct . at 1600.
197508 U.S. 520, 113 S. Ct . 2217, 124 L.Ed. 2d 472 (1993)
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nature. 198 The Court distinguished this case from Smith and
held that the ordinance was not neutral . The Court held that
if the "object of the law is to infringe upon or restrict
practices because of their religious motivation, the law is
not neutral; and it is invalid unless it is justified by a
compelling interest and is narrowly tailored to advance that
interest." 199 Since the ordinances were not neutral, a compel-
ling interest test was applied and the ordinances were struck
down.
b. Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993.
In response to the Court's decision in Smith, in 1993
Congress passed a statute in an attempt to undo the Supreme
Court decision. The Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993
( "RFRA"
)
200 had the stated purpose of restoring the compel-
ling governmental interest test for laws that were nonetheless
neutral toward religion. 201 The Act also provided a claim
for persons "whose religious exercise is substantially
burdened by government". 202 Under the Act, the compelling
governmental interest test applied to all levels of govern-
ment, from the federal government to subdivisions of state
198508 U.S. at 526.
193 Id. at 533, 113 S. Ct . at 2227.
200Pub. L. No. 103-141. 107 Stat. 1488 (1993) (codified at
42 U.S.C. §§2000bb et seg. ) .
20142 U.S.C. §2000bb(l).
20242 U.S.C. §2000bb(2) .
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governments, including local government entities with authori-
ty to enact zoning regulations. Also, laws of neutral
application toward religion could not substantially burden
religious practice unless they were in furtherance of a
compelling governmental interest and were the least restric-
tive means of furthering that interest. 203
A number of cases brought pursuant to RFRA were land use
regulation cases. The test applied in the RFRA cases was
whether there was a substantial burden on the religious use
rather than whether the burden of free exercise rights
outweighed the burden on the government. Clearly, more cases
involving religious uses in zoning matters would have been
filed in federal than in state courts under RFRA, had it been
upheld.
Recently, in City of Boerne v. P.F. Flores, 2QA the
Supreme Court struck down RFRA. The Boerne case involved an
expansion of an historic mission-style Roman Catholic Church
in San Antonio, Texas. Under the City's land use regulations,
the church was not allowed to expand the historic building.
The archbishop appealed the decision claiming that it violated
RFRA. The trial court held that Congress had exceeded its
powers in enacting RFRA and found it unconstitutional. The
Fifth Circuit reversed the trial court, and the case was
appealed to the United States Supreme Court . The Supreme
20342 U.S.C. §2000bb-l(b) (1) and (2).
204521 U.S. 507, 117 S. Ct . 2157, 138 L.Ed. 2d 624 (1997)
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Court held that RFRA was an unconstitutional exercise of
Congressional power.
Unfortunately, the Supreme Court did not take advantage
of an opportunity to offer some guidance on the matter of land
use regulation of religious uses. Presumably, we would go
back to applying the Smith test; if the regulation is a
neutral, generally applicable law, then it would be exempt
from the compelling governmental interest test, even if it
prohibits or substantially burdens religious exercise.
However, we have little guidance in religious land use cases
if there is a law that is facially neutral and of general
applicability. We know the compelling state interest test
does not apply, but which standard do we follow?
There is no parallel lack of guidance in other cases
involving First Amendment issues . Other First Amendment
matters are more clearly defined by federal case law. For
example, the legal standard for land use decisions relating to
adult entertainment and sign regulations is relatively
established. There are few federal court decisions governing
religious land use regulations; most cases are brought in
state courts and the approach by state courts varies.
III. The New York and California Positions
State courts follow two principal lines of decisions:
the New York position and the California position. 205 They
represent extremes. The New York position is the most
205Mandelker & Cunningham, Planning And Control OF Land Development
(Michie, 2d ed. 1985)
.
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restrictive giving considerable deference to religious
uses. 206 The New York line of cases represents the majority-
position. The California position allows exclusion of
religious uses to control traffic, parking, and noise. The
minority view is that churches are subject to zoning
ordinances in the same manner and to the same extent as other
uses. 207
The stage was set in New York in 1956 in Community
Synagogue v. Bates. 206 In Bates, a church applied for a
variance to transform a single-family home in a residential
district into a church use. After considering evidence that
the building would not meet fire laws, and that the use would
include 'social clubs', the local government denied the
permit . The New York Court of Appeals reversed the denial and
concluded that religious uses include more than pure worship
activities. The court contended that its decision was
consistent with the intent of our forefathers and stated "the
206Diocese of Rochester v. Planning Board, 1 N.Y.2d 508,
526, 136 N.E.2d 827, 836, 154 N.Y.S. 2d 849, 862 (1956);
Community Synagogue v. Bates, 1 N.Y.2d 445, 136 N.E.2d 488,
154 N.Y.S. 2d 15 (1956) ; Westchester Reform Temple v. Brown, 22
N.Y.2d 488, 493, 239 N.E.2d 891, 894, 293 N.Y.S. 2d 297, 301
(1968); New York Inst, of Technology v. LeBoutillier , 33
N.Y.2d 125, 305 N.E.2d 754, 350 N.Y.2d 754, 350 N.Y.S. 2d 623
(1973) .
207Corp. of Presiding Bishop of Church of Latter Day
Saints v. City of Porterville, 90 Cal . App. 2d 656, 203 P. 2d
824 (1949), cert, denied. 338 U.S. 805, 94 L.Ed. 487, 70 S . Ct
.
78 (1950) ; Tustin Heights Ass'n v. Board of Supervisors, 33 9
P. 2d 914, 922 (Cal. App. 1959) .
208 1 N.Y. 2d 445, 136 N.E. 2d 488, 154 N.Y. S. 2d 15
(1956) .
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men and women who left Scrooby for Leyden and eventually came
to Plymouth in order to worship God where they wished and in
their own way must have thought they had terminated the
interference of public authorities with free and unhandicapped
exercise of religion". 209
New York has been the most forceful in providing
protection to religious uses in a series of cases in which
religious uses were disapproved by a municipality as a
conditional use in residential zoning districts. The usual
concerns about traffic congestion and effects on property
values that occur in land use cases do not apply to religious
uses according to the New York cases. 210
The minority of courts take the opposite view. Califor-
nia leads this group. For example, in 194 9 in Corporation of
Presiding Bishop of Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day
Saints v. City of Porterville
,
211 the California court accepted
the traffic congestion and property value arguments rejected
by the New York courts to uphold the exclusion of churches
from residential districts. According to California courts,
regulating religious institutions through a zoning ordinance
is no different than regulating them by requiring them to
conform to a local building code . When faced with the
209 Id. at 458, 136 N.E. 2d at 490, 154 N.Y.S. 2d at 17.
210See, e.g., Diocese of Rochester v. Planning Board, 1
N.Y. 2d 508, 136 N.E. 2d 827, 154 N.Y.S. 2d 849 (1956)
.
211 90 Cal. App. 2d 656, 203 P. 2d 823, appeal dismissed,
338 U.S. 805 (1949) .
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argument that such regulation is an impermissible restriction
on religious worship, the court in the Porterville case
maintained that the denial of a permit is not a prohibition
against religious worship and the record contained no evidence
that the church building could not be erected in an appropri-
ate district. 212
IV. Georgia Courts and the 11th Circuit Court of Appeals
a. Georgia Constitutional Provisions.
Georgia courts tend to follow the California position, or
the minority view, which applies traditional zoning law
providing a presumption of constitutionality to zoning
ordinances, even though a religious use is in question. There
are three provisions in the Georgia constitution that are
relevant to the issue of zoning of religious uses. The 1983
Georgia Constitution, Art I, §1, UlV, provides the following:
Paragraph IV. Religious Opinions; freedom of religion.
No inhabitant of this state shall be molested
in person or property or be prohibited from holding
any public office or trust on account of religious
opinions; but the right of freedom of religion
shall not be so construed as to excuse acts of
licentiousness or justify practices inconsistent
with the peace and safety of the state. 213
Art I, §2, %7 of the 1983 Georgia Constitution provides:
Paragraph VII. Separation of Church and state.
No money shall ever be taken from the public
treasury, directly or indirectly, in aid of any
212See Rathkopf, The Law Of Zoning & Planning, §20.01
213Ga. Const, art. I, §1, ^4.
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church, sect, cult, or religious denomination or of
214any sectarian institution
Also, Art. IX, §12, ^4 of the 1983 Georgia Constitution
provides that each local government may adopt plans and may
exercise the power of zoning. The provision further states
that the General Assembly may establish procedures for
exercising the power of zoning, which the General Assembly has
done. 215
b. Georgia State Courts.
There are few Georgia cases addressing the issue of
zoning and religious uses and they are generally decided based
on traditional zoning law, following the same pattern as the
California line of cases. For example, in 194 9 a group of
Jehovah's Witnesses attempted to locate a church on Juniper
Street in Atlanta. The Court, in Galfas v. Ailor, 216 stated
that the city had broad authority as to zoning and in the
establishment of districts and regulations. The court held
that courts will not question the discretion vested in the
city to allow a church to locate in a particular use district
unless the discretion is manifestly abused. Given evidence of
the potential traffic hazard, the court upheld the exclusion
of the church. 217
214Ga. Const. Art. I, §2, 1J7.
215O.C.G.A. 36-66-1 et seg.
21681 Ga. App. 13, 57 S.E. 2d 834 (1950)
217 Id.
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The Gal fas case was appealed to federal court. 218
However, the Fifth Circuit held that under the doctrine of
abstention, the constitutionality of the ordinance was left to
the state courts. 219
Georgia courts follow the general premise that a zoning
law should be upheld unless it is unreasonable or arbitrary.
For example, in 1964, a group of Jehovah's Witnesses made a
request for a special use permit for building a church on
Wieuca Road in Atlanta that was very similar to that made in
the Galfas case. In Rogers v. Mayor & Aldermen of the City of
Atlanta, 220 the Georgia Court of Appeals stated the general
rule that " [i] t must be said before the ordinance can be
declared unconstitutional, that [the standards] are clearly
arbitrary and unreasonable, having no substantial relation to
the public health, safety, morals or general welfare." 221 The
court did offer that "any zoning ordinance that absolutely
excludes churches from a residential area is invalid under one
or more of these constitutional guarantees." 222 However, the
court stated that churches are "subject to reasonable regula-
tion, both referring to property in the zone generally and to
218Galfas v. City of Atlanta, 193 F.2d 931 (5th Cir.
1952) .
219 Jd.
220110 Ga. App. 114, 137 S.E. 2d 668 (1964).
221Id. at 117 citing Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty
Co., 272 U.S. 365, 395, 47 S. Ct . 114, 71 L.E. 303 (1926).
222 Id. at 116
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churches specifically, provided the regulations are reasonable
and contain some standards". 223 However, in Rogers, the
court held that the government had abused its discretion in
applying the ordinance and reversed the denial of the reli-
gious use permit. Thus, it seems that given two cases with
very similar facts, and an announcement by the court in each
case that it will defer to zoning ordinances, the level of
deference varies on a case-by-case basis.
Typically, it is very difficult for a party challenging
a law to meet the burden of proving that a law is arbitrary or
unreasonable. The appellate courts allow broad discretion to
local governments in zoning matters and are very reluctant to
find laws to be arbitrary or unreasonable. But there are a
number of zoning cases in Georgia in which the courts have
found the government's denial of zoning permits to be arbi-
trary or unreasonable. In trying to understand the distinc-
tions, perhaps it is instructive to consider the case of
Tuggle v. Manning224 . Tuggle did not involve a religious
land use matter; it involved a dispute over the location of a
shopping center. Yet, in this case the court was concerned
with the discriminatory nature of the zoning ordinance. The
court found the denial of a zoning permit to be arbitrary and
unreasonable. Three justices, Chief Justice Duckworth, and
223 Id. at 116.
224224 Ga. 29, 159 S.E. 2d. 703 (1968)
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Justices Grice and Nichols dissented in the opinion. The
majority opinion stated
[z]oning ordinances not only must be non-discrimi-
natory and reasonable, but must be applied in a
non-discriminatory and reasonable manner and are to
be strictly construed in favor of the landowner. 225
. . .Although a zoning ordinance may not be per se
invalid, yet when the provisions of such an ordi-
nance come to be applied to particular premises, or
to particular conditions, or to be considered in
connection with specific complaints, some of them
may be found to be clearly arbitrary and unreason-
able. Hence, the determination of the reasonable-
ness of zoning restrictions must be made in the
light of facts presented in each case . 226
The court found the ordinance to be unreasonable and arbitrary
as applied to the petitioner's property.
More recently, in Lacey v. State221 , the Supreme Court
of Georgia decided a case in which a minister had been
convicted of violating a zoning regulation that permitted only
single family dwellings in areas zoned agricultural
-
residential. The minister contended he was sharing his home
with a family which was having financial difficulties. He
claimed that the government violated his right to free
exercise of religion by refusing to allow this religious use
of his home . The Court held that the use of his own private
225 Jd. at 32-33, 224 Ga . at 705.
226 Id. at 33, 159 S.E. 2d at 705 (emphasis added)
227270 Ga. 37, 507 S.E. 2d 441 (1998).
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residence for rental purposes was not necessarily incidental
to that of a church. 228 The Court held
[t]hat Lacey has a religious motivation does not
require a court to declare an ordinance, which is
valid as to others, to be invalid as to him. To do
so would leave the governing authority with the
power to grant zoning variances to one citizen
because he is found to have an acceptable religious
motivation and to deny a variance to another who is
found to have an unacceptable religious motivation
or whose religious motivation is determined to be a
subterfuge . 229
Therefore, the court held that the zoning ordinance underlying
Lacey' s conviction did not violate his constitutional right to
free exercise of religion. 230
Thus, it appears that in Georgia the courts will review
the facts of each case, on a case by case basis, and rather
than automatically deferring to the local government, the
courts may deem a zoning law to be unreasonable and reverse a
denial of a zoning permit. Therefore, when filing a religious
land use matter in a Georgia Court, one can only hope that the
Court will make a "determination of the reasonableness of
zoning restrictions ... in light of the facts presented" with
a favorable result
.
228 Id.
,
citing Ass'n for Educa . Devel . v. Hayward, 533
S.W.2d 579, 587 (Mo. 1976).
229 Jd. at 443.
230 Id.
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c. 11th Circuit Court of Appeals Cases.
Federal courts, like Georgia courts, are not particularly-
protective of religious uses in zoning matters. Although the
federal court refused to address the constitutional issues
raised in Galfas, the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals has
heard a number of cases involving zoning and religious uses.
In fact, the Eleventh Circuit has probably provided more
guidance than other federal courts on this issue. 231 The
Eleventh Circuit has decided a number of cases, some of which
have not followed a compelling governmental interest test.
For example, in Grosz v. City of Miami Beach, Fla., 232
rather than following a compelling governmental interest test,
the Court held that there were two threshold questions: (1)
does the ordinance affect only religious conduct, not belief?
And, (2) does it have a secular purpose and effect? If the
answer to both is yes, the competing governmental and reli-
gious interests are balanced. In Grosz, the Court held that
the interests of the city in its zoning ordinance outweighed
the burden on religious practice to conduct services in
compliance with the code.
First Assembly of God of Naples, Florida v. Collier
County, Florida, 223 was decided after RFRA was enacted, but
231See Pearlman, Zoning and the Location of Religious
Establishments
, 31 Cath. Law R. 314 (1988) , for a discussion of
federal cases in a land use context.
232721 F. 2d 729 (11th Cir. 1983) .
23320 F. 3d 419 (11th Cir. 1994) .
67
the church apparently did not raise RFRA as an issue. There,
the church had received permission to build a day care center.
Later, the center was converted into a homeless shelter. The
ordinance provided for churches "and their accessory uses."
The city argued that the homeless shelter was not an "accesso-
ry use" and that the zoning code did not allow a homeless
shelter in that location. The Court applied the Smith and
Lukumi test and held that laws of neutral and general applica-
tion need not be justified by a compelling governmental
interest. Unlike the Lukumi ordinances, the ordinance in this
case was held to be neutral and of general application and was
therefore upheld.
The Eleventh Circuit appears to follow the Smith doctrine
and has not been particularly protective of religious uses.
However, it further appears that one would be more likely to
meet with success in federal court rather than in the Georgia
state courts in challenging a land use regulation based on an
unconstitutional restriction of religion argument.
V. Conclusion
The local government's power to enact zoning regulations
falls within the general welfare power, but, when zoning
regulations impact religious uses, the presumption of consti-
tutionality should be reversed. However, that clearly has not
been true in Georgia. Some state courts, for example, the
State of New York, have provided protection for religious uses
in the face of zoning regulations. Other states, including
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Georgia, follow the California position and do not provide
special protection for religious uses. They simply follow
traditional zoning analysis: a presumption of constitutional-
ity can be rebutted only if the law is proven to be unreason-
able or arbitrary.
Most zoning challenges are filed in state courts.
However, its seems that, particularly in states like Georgia
and California, one would seek constitutional protection in
federal courts. Unfortunately, however, federal courts have
not been consistent in providing constitutional protection for
religious uses in the face of adverse zoning ordinances. If
the Religious Freedom Restoration Act "RFRA" had been upheld,
probably more cases would have been filed in federal courts.
RFRA established the compelling state interest test which
would reverse the approach used by Georgia courts
.
Since RFRA was held to be an unconstitutional exercise of
congressional power, the compelling state interest test is no
longer applicable, and one must look to the Smith case for
guidance. The Court in Smith held that neutral, generally
applicable laws are exempt from constitutional scrutiny, even
if they prohibit or substantially burden religious exercise.
Although that standard does not offer much in the way of
religious protection, it provides more protection than the
standard followed by Georgia courts.
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